Throughout western Europe, metropolitan governance is back on the agenda. Since the early 1990s, new forms of city–suburban cooperation, regional coordination, regionwide spatial planning and metropolitan institutional organization have been promoted in major city–regions. In contrast to the forms of metropolitan governance that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period – which emphasized administrative modernization, interterritorial equalization and the efficient delivery of public services – the newest wave of metropolitan governance reform is focused upon economic priorities such as territorial competitiveness and attracting external capital investment in the context of geoeconomic and European integration. This article develops an interpretation of the new metropolitan governance in western Europe in two steps. First, I situate the new metropolitan governance in historical context by underscoring its qualitative differences from earlier waves of metropolitan institutional reform. Second, building upon a critique of contemporary 'new regionalist' discourses, I develop an interpretation of current metropolitan reform initiatives as important structural and strategic expressions of ongoing, crisis-induced transformations of state spatiality. To this end, I relate contemporary metropolitan reform projects: (a) to various broader trends and counter-trends of state spatial reorganization; and (b) to newly emergent political strategies oriented towards a reconfiguration of inherited approaches to entrepreneurial urban governance. From this perspective, contemporary forms of metropolitan institutional reform are interpreted as key expressions of ongoing processes of state rescaling through which territorial competitiveness is being promoted at a regional scale, albeit in highly contradictory, often self-undermining ways. The article concludes by summarizing some of the methodological implications of this analysis for future studies of urban–regional restructuring and the production of new state spaces.

**KEY WORDS**
- metropolitan governance
- new regionalism
- path dependency
- state rescaling
- urban entrepreneurialism
- western Europe
specific socio-economic assets. From London, Glasgow, Manchester, the Randstad, Brussels, Copenhagen–Øresund–Malmö, Lille, Lyon and Paris to Berlin, the Ruhr district, Hanover, Frankfurt/Rhine–Main, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna, Zürich, Geneva–Lausanne–Montreux, Madrid, Barcelona, Bologna and Milan, national and local economic policies are being linked more directly to diverse forms of spatial planning, infrastructure investment and political-economic coordination on a metropolitan scale. In each of these city–regions, and in others throughout western Europe, the introduction of new frameworks for city–suburban cooperation and new regional administrative structures has been justified as a basic institutional precondition for promoting territorial development under global capitalism and an integrated European Union (EU).

Since the early 1980s, the proliferation of entrepreneurial, competitiveness-oriented local economic policies has been documented extensively throughout the western European city-system (Harvey, 1989a; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993). The key role of municipal political authorities in promoting economic development and inward capital investment is now widely acknowledged as an essential element of urban governance under post-Fordist capitalism (Hall and Hubbard, 1997). The intensification of debates on metropolitan regionalism in recent years arguably represents an important modification of the forms of local economic development policy that were diffused throughout western Europe during the preceding decade. Since the early 1990s, localist strategies of territorial competition have been ratcheted-up into regionwide strategies of economic development that embrace the geographical scale of entire metropolitan agglomerations. As Krätke (1999: 696) explains:

As a result of intensified interregional competition, the forms of governance in regional development have also changed: the political-administrative authorities of the region are no longer content to offer business activities a suitable spatial framework containing good infrastructural equipment. They also seek to initiate entrepreneurial activities themselves. From this perspective, regions should be managed like a firm, and the region should be actively marketed as a ‘product’ … Thus, many regions behave like competing firms in the area of economic development policy.

The collective action problems and political obstacles associated with such regionalization strategies are significant and, in some cases, nearly insurmountable (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996). Many programmes of metropolitan institutional reform have been implemented only in a relatively weak form. Nonetheless, even in cases of apparent failure, metropolitan reform initiatives have given issues such as city–suburban cooperation and regionwide economic governance a new prominence in local, regional and national political struggles throughout western Europe. In many instances, the defeat of more comprehensive metropolitan reform initiatives has generated a new momentum for compromise solutions that address regional governance problems through informal partnerships, interorganizational coordination and public–private cooperation. In the face of these developments, major political-economic actors throughout western Europe have embraced the assumption that metropolitan regions, rather than localities or national economies, represent the natural economic zones in which economic development must be promoted. Whatever the intellectual shortcomings and political dangers of this so-called ‘new regionalism’ (Lovering, 1999), it appears to be exercising a considerable influence upon the ideology, practice and institutional infrastructure of urban governance in western European city–regions.

Against this background, this article confronts two specific tasks. First, I situate the new metropolitan governance in historical context by underscoring its qualitative differences from earlier waves of metropolitan institutional reform in western Europe. Second, building upon a critique of contemporary new regionalist discourses, I develop an interpretation of current metropolitan reform initiatives as important structural and strategic expressions of ongoing, crisis-induced transformations of state spatiality. To this end, I relate contemporary metropolitan reform projects: (a) to various broader trends and counter-trends of state spatial reorganization; and (b) to newly emergent political strategies oriented towards a reconfiguration of inherited approaches to entrepreneurial urban governance. From this perspective, contemporary forms of metropolitan institutional reform represent key expressions of ongoing processes of state rescaling through which...
territorial competitiveness is being promoted at a regional scale, albeit in highly contradictory, often self-undermining ways. The article concludes by summarizing some of the methodological implications of this analysis for future studies of urban–regional restructuring and the production of new state spaces.

Much of the literature on urban and regional political economy has tended to bracket processes of national state restructuring. Recently, however, a number of scholars have begun to examine the ways in which: (a) national states mould the production and transformation of local and regional places; and (b) the resultant politics of place in turn shapes the continual evolution of state spatial organization at multiple geographical scales. By building upon such studies, the following analysis is intended to exemplify and advance an approach to urban studies that is explicitly attuned to the intimate links between urbanization processes, uneven geographical development and the continually evolving spatialities of state power under capitalism. Clearly, the rich, multifaceted and contested political content of recent struggles over metropolitan governance cannot be reduced to the problem of state rescaling (Keil, 2000; Herrschel and Newman, 2002). I would argue, nonetheless, that this issue provides a useful analytical starting point through which many other aspects of contemporary metropolitan political and institutional transformations may be illuminated.

Metropolitan governance and the historical geographies of capitalism

The problem of administrative and jurisdictional fragmentation within large-scale urban regions has long been a topic of intense debate among North American and western European urbanists. In particular, the spatial mismatch between local administrative units and the functional-economic territory of metropolitan regions has been analysed from a range of methodological perspectives, including public-choice theory, liberal approaches and radical or Marxian perspectives (Keating 1997a). David Harvey (1989b: 153) describes the problem concisely as follows:

[Local government] boundaries do not necessarily coincide with the fluid zones of urban labour and commodity markets or infrastructural formation; and their adjustment through annexation, local government reorganization, and metropolitan-wide cooperation is cumbersome, though often of great long-term significance. Local jurisdictions frequently divide rather than unify the urban region, thus emphasizing the segmentations (such as that between city and suburb) rather than the tendency toward structured coherence and class-alliance formation.

Although intra-metropolitan jurisdictional fragmentation is considerably more pronounced among major US cities than in their western European counterparts, scholars have effectively demonstrated the profound consequences of metropolitan institutional arrangements for patterns of urban development throughout the western European city-system (Barlow, 1991; Sharpe, 1995a; Terhorst and Van de Ven, 1997). From city–suburban relations, public service delivery, public infrastructure investment and fiscal policy to spatial planning and economic development policy, metropolitan political structures have played a major role in moulding the socio-economic geographies and developmental trajectories of western European city–regions throughout the 20th century (Goldsmith, 2001).

The historical evolution of metropolitan institutional arrangements has been closely intertwined with successive phases of capitalist urbanization. As the reproduction of capital has become more directly dependent upon processes of urban, suburban and regional development, the territorial configuration of metropolitan agglomerations has become an object of intense sociopolitical struggles, pitting place-based alliances of classes, class fractions and other social forces against one another in a continual effort to achieve opposed goals in the realms of production, distribution, reproduction and governance. Meanwhile, as the process of capitalist territorial development has accelerated and intensified on a global scale, the geographic configuration of urban regions has likewise evolved quite markedly. The monocentric urban regions of the classical industrial era were superseded during the course of the 20th century by the polynucleated metropolitan regions, urban fields and megalopoli of Fordist capitalism.
Since the mid-1970s, the urban-region grids of the postwar epoch have been still further reworked to form still larger and more decentralized configurations of territorial development that have been characterized variously as exopolises, 100-mile cities, multiplex cities and mega-cities (Soja, 2000). Throughout the older industrialized world, each of these historical configurations of capitalist territorial organization has generated contextually specific governance problems and sociopolitical conflicts within major city-regions. Within this confusing mosaic of perpetually shifting urban spaces, metropolitan reform initiatives may be viewed as strategies to subject the capitalist urban process to regionally configured forms of state regulatory control.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, large-scale urban agglomerations such as New York, London and Berlin introduced consolidated metropolitan institutions. It was only in the 1960s and early 1970s, however, that metropolitan political institutions were introduced more widely among North American and western European city-regions (Keating, 1998). During this era, in conjunction with the expansion of Fordist-Keynesian social engineering projects, debates on metropolitan governance focused predominantly upon the issues of administrative efficiency, local service provision, regional planning and spatial redistribution within the nationally organized macroeconomic policy frameworks of the Keynesian welfare national state. Larger units of urban territorial administration were generally seen as being analogous to Fordist forms of mass-production insofar as they were thought to generate economies of scale in the field of public service provision (Keating, 1997a: 118). As suburbanization proceeded apace during the postwar period, consolidated metropolitan institutions were widely introduced in order to differentiate city-regions functionally among zones of production, housing, transportation, recreation and so forth. Among the major metropolitan institutions established during this period in western Europe were the Greater London Council (1963), the Madrid Metropolitan Area Planning and Coordinating Commission (1963) the Rijnmond or Greater Rotterdam Port Authority (1964), the communautés urbaines in French cities such as Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg (1966), the Regionalverband Stuttgart (1972), the metropolitan counties in British cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle (1974), the Corporació Metropolitana de Barcelona (1974), the Greater Copenhagen Council (1974), the Umlandverband Frankfurt (1974) and the Kommunalverband Ruhr (1975) (Sharpe, 1995a; 1995b). These large-scale, technocratic and bureaucratized forms of metropolitan political organization served as a key institutional pillar within the nationalized system of spatial Keynesianism that prevailed throughout western Europe from the early 1960s until the late 1970s (Brenner, forthcoming: ch. 4).

By the early 1980s, however, these large-scale technocratic projects of metropolitan governance had been widely discredited and were increasingly under attack. Following the systemic crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian developmental model in the 1970s, a new mosaic of uneven regional development and territorial competition began to crystallize throughout western Europe. The economic infrastructure of major urban regions was systematically restructured in conjunction with the decline of traditional Fordist production systems, the mobilization of new corporate accumulation strategies, the crystallization of new spatial divisions of labour within neo-Fordist and flexible production systems, the intensified financialization of capital and the acceleration of geoeconomic integration (Dunford and Kafkalas, 1992; Swyngedouw, 1992). Under these conditions, the forms of urban managerialism, welfarist redistribution and compensatory regional policy associated with spatial Keynesianism were gradually retrenched or dismantled. Local governments subsequently began to mobilize new strategies of endogenous economic development in order to cope with place-specific socio-economic problems, to adjust to newly imposed fiscal constraints and to attract new sources of external capital investment (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993). In this context of national fiscal austerity, proliferating entrepreneurial urban policies and intensifying interlocality competition, consolidated metropolitan institutions were increasingly viewed as outdated, excessively bureaucratic and cumbersome vestiges of ‘big government’ (Barlow, 1991: 289–98). Keating (1997a: 122) explains, ‘Large-scale local government, like other large-scale organizations, came to be blamed for all manner of problems and
political and intellectual fashion moved back to the “small is beautiful” philosophy’. Within this rapidly neoliberalizing political environment, official support for large-scale strategic planning projects waned and traditional welfarist policy relays were significantly dismantled or downsized. In the wake of these realignments, during the mid- to late 1980s, major metropolitan institutions such as the Greater London Council, the English metropolitan counties, the Madrid Metropolitan Area Planning and Coordinating Commission, the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation, the Greater Copenhagen Council and the Rijnmond in Rotterdam were abolished. Elsewhere in western Europe, metropolitan institutional forms were formally preserved but severely weakened due to centrally imposed budgetary pressures, the widespread adoption of neoliberal, deregulatory policies and intensified competition between city cores and suburban peripheries for external capital investment (Sharpe 1995a; 1995b).

This low tide of metropolitan regionalism during the 1980s resulted not only from external constraints, a sustained economic recession and neoliberal political realignments, but also, in part, from various internal problems within inherited forms of urban territorial administration. Because metropolitan governments during the postwar period were generally imposed from above, and were usually organized according to purely functional criteria such as efficiency, they generally lacked popular legitimacy and were thus particularly vulnerable to ideological attack. Moreover, most of the metropolitan authorities created during the postwar era remained relatively weak; their planning agendas were thus frequently undermined or blocked by other units of territorial administration. Because the metropolitan governments during the postwar period were generally imposed from above, and were usually organized according to purely functional criteria such as efficiency, they generally lacked popular legitimacy and were thus particularly vulnerable to ideological attack. Moreover, most of the metropolitan authorities created during the postwar era remained relatively weak; their planning agendas were thus frequently undermined or blocked by other units of territorial administration. Because the metropolitan governments during the postwar period were generally imposed from above, and were usually organized according to purely functional criteria such as efficiency, they generally lacked popular legitimacy and were thus particularly vulnerable to ideological attack. Moreover, most of the metropolitan authorities created during the postwar era remained relatively weak; their planning agendas were thus frequently undermined or blocked by other units of territorial administration. Because the metropolitan governments during the postwar period were generally imposed from above, and were usually organized according to purely functional criteria such as efficiency, they generally lacked popular legitimacy and were thus particularly vulnerable to ideological attack. Moreover, most of the metropolitan authorities created during the postwar era remained relatively weak; their planning agendas were thus frequently undermined or blocked by other units of territorial administration.

Towards competitive regionalism? The resurgence of metropolitan governance in the 1990s

As of the late 1980s, many administrative scientists had concluded that metropolitan models of urban governance were in the midst of a major intellectual and political crisis (Barlow, 1991; Sharpe, 1995a). Yet, shortly after the high-profile abolitions of the Greater London Council and Rotterdam’s Rijnmond, proposals to reconstitute metropolitan political institutions began to generate considerable discussion in major European urban regions. Subsequently, during the course of the 1990s, intense debates on the installation of new metropolitan institutions have proliferated throughout the western European urban system, leading in many cases to significant changes in urban and regional governance and territorial planning systems. In some cities, such as in London, Bologna, Stuttgart, Hanover and Copenhagen, entirely new metropolitan institutions have been constructed in which a broad range of regional planning competencies and administrative powers are concentrated. More frequently, new frameworks of metropolitan governance have been superimposed upon inherited administrative geographies and have provided new institutional frameworks for political negotiations regarding various major regional issues, from economic development policy, place marketing and infrastructural planning to suburban sprawl, environmental sustainability and democratic accountability. In most western European countries, metropolitan institutional frameworks are no longer being designed according to a single recipe and imposed from above, but are emerging ‘as a product of the system of actors as the process [of institutional reform] unfolds’ (Lefèvre, 1998: 18). Faced with these ongoing institutional changes,
regulatory experiments and political debates in 
major European urban regions, numerous 
commentators have suggested that a renaissance of 
metropolitan regionalism is currently under way 
throughout western Europe.2

As recent scholarship has indicated, the current 
renaissance of metropolitan regionalism in western 
Europe has been extraordinarily multifaceted 
(Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Salet et al., 2003). 
Therefore, each project of regionwide institutional 
restructuring must be understood with reference to 
the nationally and locally specific industrial 
landscape and administrative-constitutional system 
in which it has emerged. Processes of regional 
economic restructuring have interacted in place-
specific ways with inherited institutional 
frameworks, leading in turn to the establishment of 
‘a more bewildering tangle of municipalities, 
governmental and regional organizations and 
institutions, and public, private, or informal 
cooperative approaches with differing actors, 
functions, and jurisdictions’ (Heinz, 2000: 27). This 
‘bewildering tangle’ of new metropolitan 
institutions has also been intertwined with new, 
regionalized configurations of power relations, or 
‘power-geometries’ (Massey, 1993), in which 
opposed sociopolitical forces struggle to mould 
the trajectories of regional economic restructuring and 
institutional change. Even though these regionalized 
patterns of institutional restructuring and political 
struggle have necessarily been articulated in place-
specific forms, the broad outlines of four pan-
European trends can be discerned.

1. Metropolitan reform as a form of locational policy
One of the most strikingly novel characteristics of 
newly emergent metropolitan regionalisms has been 
their explicitly entrepreneurial or competitive 
orientation (Jonas and Ward, 2002). Proposals to 
reconfigure inherited frameworks of metropolitan 
governance have been justified in large part as a 
means to transpose extant strategies of local 
economic development onto a regional scale and 
thus to position major urban agglomerations 
strategically within European and global flows of 
capital. In stark contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, in 
which debates on metropolitan institutions focused 
on the issues of administrative efficiency, local 
service provision and interterritorial equalization 
within the administrative hierarchies of the 

Keynesian welfare national state, most 
contemporary western European discussions of 
metropolitan reform have been oriented towards the 
overarching priority of promoting endogenous 
regional growth in a context of accelerated geo-
economic and European integration and a perceived 
intensification of inter-place competition for mobile 
capital investment. In this sense, metropolitan 
reform strategies represent an important instance of 
a new ‘locational policy’ (Standortpolitik) through 
which local and regional growth machines are 
attempting to enhance the competitive advantages of 
strategic regional economies.3 In short, across the 
western European urban and regional system, the 
managerial forms of metropolitan political 
organization that predominated during the era of 
high Fordism have been superseded by 
entrepreneurial, competitiveness-oriented 
approaches to metropolitan governance that 
privilege developmentalist priorities such as 
economic growth, labour market flexibility and 
territorial competitiveness.

2. Narratives of globalization and European 
interspatial competition
Since the run-up to the 
establishment of the Single European Market in the 
early 1990s, a number of key discursive tropes have 
been repeated with striking regularity among 
western European policymakers engaged in debates 
on metropolitan reform:

• the claim that geo-economic integration has 
  intensified inter-place competition for 
  hypermobile capital investment at European and 
  global scales;
• the claim that large-scale urban regions rather 
  than localities, cities or national economies 
  represent the most basic territorial units between 
  which this competition is occurring;
• the claim that competition among places and 
  localities within a major urban region to attract 
  external capital investment undermines the 
  region’s capacity to compete for such investment 
  at supraregional scales;
• the claim that new forms of regionwide 
  cooperation, spatial planning and economic 
  governance are required in order to enhance a 
  region’s capacity to engage in global and 
  European territorial competition;
• the claim that effective regionwide economic
cooperation hinges upon the incorporation of important local and regional economic ‘stakeholders’ – including business associations, chambers of commerce, airport development agencies, transport authorities and other local boosterist organizations – into major regional development initiatives;

• the claim that extant administrative structures and spatial planning arrangements undermine regional economic competitiveness insofar as they fragment rather than unify a region’s capacities for economic development;

• the claim that the introduction of new state administrative structures would provide an important institutional means to enhance regionwide cooperation, to bundle regional productive capacities and to strengthen regional competitive advantages.

Although such claims have crystallized in neoliberal, centrist and social democratic forms (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993), they appear to represent a shared discursive-ideological foundation on which basis most debates on metropolitan reform are currently being conducted across western Europe. In contrast to the ‘new localisms’ of the 1980s, which promoted a zero-sum politics of territorial competition at both local and supralocal scales (Mayer, 1994; Peck and Tickell, 1994), these emergent ‘new regionalisms’ embrace cooperation within urban regions as an institutional springboard for engaging still more aggressively in territorial competition against other urban regions at national, European and global scales (Prigge and Ronneberger, 1996).

3. New regulatory geographies

In contrast to the hierarchical-bureaucratic frameworks of metropolitan service delivery that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s, the entrepreneurial approach to metropolitan governance of the 1990s has generally been grounded upon a new model of public action which ‘highlights values of negotiation, partnership, voluntary participation and flexibility in the constitution of new structures’ (Lefèvre, 1998: 18; see also Healey, 2000). Rather strikingly, across western Europe, this emphasis on ‘lean and mean’ forms of public administration – which is in turn derived from neoliberal discourses on the New Public Management and public choice theory – has replaced the traditional Fordist-Keynesian assumption that large-scale bureaucratic hierarchies would generate economies of scale in the delivery of public services. Consequently:

… whereas the question of regional government was once addressed mainly in the context of an administrative hierarchy, with an emphasis on vertical relationships, the situation today is one in which the horizontal relations among regions are equally important, as also is a vertical relationship that goes beyond the state. (Barlow, 1997: 410)

In this manner, metropolitan governance is being redefined from a vertical, coordinative and redistributive relationship within a national administrative hierarchy into a horizontal, competitive and developmentalist relationship between subnational economic territories battling against one another at European and global scales to attract external capital investment.

4. Lines of power and political contestation

Recent metropolitan reform initiatives have been supported primarily by: (a) modernizing national governments; (b) political elites within entrepreneurial and/or fiscally distressed central cities; and (c) local and regional business elites, industrialists and other ‘boosterists’. The most vocal opponents of comprehensive metropolitan reforms have generally included: (a) representatives of middle-tier or provincial governmental agencies that perceive powerful metropolitan institutions as a threat to their administrative authority; (b) ‘militant particularist’ (Harvey, 1996) representatives of wealthy suburban towns that fear central city dominance and/or reject external claims on the local tax base; and (c) residents within large cities that fear a loss of democratic accountability and local political control (Heinz, 2000: 21–8). The confrontation between these opposed political-economic forces and territorial alliances has significantly shaped the process of metropolitan governance reform within most major western European city–regions.

In sum, while there has been a marked discrepancy between demands for comprehensive administrative reforms within metropolitan regions and the more modest types of regionwide cooperation and spatial planning that have actually been implemented during the 1990s (Newman, 2000), the preceding
discussion suggests that contemporary transformations of metropolitan governance in western Europe share a number of common features across national, regional and local contexts.

Decoding metropolitan governance reform: the limits of ‘new regionalist’ interpretations

It is tempting, at first glance, to interpret the contemporary renaissance of metropolitan regionalism in western Europe as a major expression of the processes of subnational political-economic mobilization that have been described under the rubric of the ‘new regionalism’. Although the notion of a new regionalism is intensely contentious (Lovering, 1999; Jones, 2001; MacLeod, 2001), it has been used quite pervasively in recent years as a shorthand reference to at least two broad strands of analysis within contemporary political and economic geography.

First, the notion of the new regionalism is often used to refer to studies of the resurgence of regional economies under conditions of globalized, post-Fordist capitalism (see, for instance, Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Amin, 1999). From this perspective, the new regionalism refers to the key role of large-scale regional agglomerations – and their concomitant interfirm relations, innovation clusters, learning processes, associational networks, untraded interdependencies and forms of institutional thickness – as the crucibles of economic development within contemporary global capitalism (Florida, 1995; Morgan, 1997). This strand of the new regionalism has focused, in particular, upon certain purportedly paradigmatic industrial districts such as Emilia-Romagna, Baden-Württemberg, Rhônes-Alpes, Boston’s Route 128, Silicon Valley and Los Angeles/Orange County. However, its arguments have also been adopted more broadly among many national, regional and local policymakers concerned to find the appropriate recipe for regional economic rejuvenation (Sabel, 1989; Scott, 2001).

Second, the notion of the new regionalism has been used to describe the new subnational political-economic landscapes – in Bullmann’s (1994) phrase, the ‘politics of the third level’ – that have emerged within a rapidly integrating EU (Keating, 1998; Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998). From this perspective, the new regionalism refers to the proposition that the nationalized political-economic spaces of postwar western Europe are being recast both upwards and downwards as a new ‘Europe of the regions’ is forged (Keating, 1997b). While the notion of a Europe of the regions was initially articulated as a political counterpoint to the orthodox liberal notion of a Europe of the corporations (Ronneberger and Schmid, 1995), it has more recently come to signify: (a) the formation of a European framework of multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations in which national governments represent one among many institutional layers involved in the formation and implementation of collectively binding policies; and (b) the geopolitical strategies of subnational economic spaces to promote endogenous regional development under conditions of intensified supranational territorial competition. Accordingly, in this second strand of discussion, the notion of a new regionalism is used to refer not only to the ‘hollowing out’ or rescaling of national political space within the supranational administrative hierarchies of the EU, but also to the enhanced roles of subnational institutions – including both regional and local governments – in establishing the regulatory infrastructure for economic governance within the Single European Market. Thus, as Keating (1998: 73) explains, the new regionalism ‘pits regions against each other in a competitive mode, rather than providing complementary roles for them in a national division of labour’.

Taken together, both strands of the new regionalism suggest that the institutional architecture of subnational political-economic spaces is being systematically reworked in the current period through a range of geo-economic and geopolitical transformations. Whatever their differences of methodology, interpretation, political orientation and empirical focus, all analysts of the new regionalism appear to concur that regions have become major geographical arenas for a wide range of institutional changes, regulatory experiments and political struggles within contemporary capitalism.

It might initially seem appropriate to interpret the recent resurgence of metropolitan regionalism in western Europe as an unambiguous verification of each of the aforementioned strands of the new
regionalist discussion. For, as indicated, recent
metropolitan reform initiatives in western European
city–regions have been justified in significant
measure as a means to promote regional economic
growth and territorial competitiveness under
conditions of accelerated global and European
integration. At the same time, in many western
European city–regions, the need for new forms of
metropolitan governance has often been justified
with reference to the purported inability of national
governments to provide the customized, place-
specific regulatory infrastructures that are said to be
required for sustained regional growth under
contemporary geo-economic conditions. From such
a perspective, the resurgence of metropolitan reform
initiatives in contemporary western Europe might
be understood as a new form of regional political
assertiveness that has crystallized in response to the
combined impacts of global economic restructuring,
accelerated European integration and national
political retrenchment. Adopting Lipietz’s (1994:
27) terminology, one might even view those western
European urban regions in which metropolitan
institutional reform has been pushed furthest as
paradigmatic examples of ‘spaces-for-themselves’ or
‘regional armatures’ in which the dominant classes
of the hegemonic bloc have (a) self-consciously
formulated a regionally coordinated strategy of
territorial development; and (b) embodied that
strategy in a specific politico-organizational form.
And finally, given the degree to which many of the
most prominent proponents of metropolitan
institutional reform in western European
city–regions have been explicitly concerned ‘to
replace the “imagined community” at the national
level with an “imagined unit of competition” at the
regional level’ (Lovering, 1999: 392), it might also
appear plausible to interpret these emergent
subnational political arenas as the organizational
bedrock for a post-Westphalian formation of
political space in which city–states, regional
directorates and supranational trade confederations
are superseding territorially sovereign national
states as the basis for collective political order
(Ohmae, 1995; Scott, 1998).

In my view, however, such new regionalist
interpretations of the current metropolitan
resurgence contain a number of methodological and
political blind spots. Many ‘vulgar’ approaches to
the new regionalism have assumed a more or less
direct correspondence between official justifications
for regional institutional change and their actual
functions and consequences for regional economic
development. In this manner, some analysts have
tended to interpret nearly any regionally configured
institutional modifications within a major urban
agglomeration as evidence for the broader and more
pervasive types of regional renaissance that are
underscored within new regionalist theories.3 This
methodological procedure can be called into
question on at least two counts.

1. Fiddling with governance while the economy burns
As more sophisticated approaches to the new
regionalism have indicated (see, for instance,
Storper and Scott, 1995; Amin, 1999), all forms of
regional institutional change do not necessarily
establish the requisite, place-specific forms
of economic governance that prevent technological
lock-ins, enhance local innovative capacities and
enable sustainable developmental trajectories (see
also Hudson et al., 1997).6 Indeed, many of the
regional institutions that are being established in
western Europe actively facilitate wasteful, zero-
sum forms of investment poaching and regulatory
downgrading. Such predatory, neomercantilist
regional policies are an important expression of
what Peck (2000: 74) has aptly described as the
‘widespread tendencies to fiddle with governance
while the economy burns’; and they are considerably
at odds with the high-trust, collaborative social
environments that characterize the industrial
districts upon which much of new regionalist theory
is based (Peck and Tickell, 1994). From this
perspective, the current regional renaissance must
be interpreted less as the geographical basis for a
new upswing of capitalist expansion than as an
expression of the intensified forms of uneven
geographical development and sociospatial
polarization that are proliferating at all spatial scales
within contemporary capitalism. With a few notable
exceptions, most analyses of the new regionalism
have bracketed this broader macroeconomic context,
or have treated it as a purely extrinsic parameter for
contemporary regional industrial dynamics
(MacLeod, 2000: 224).

2. New regionalism as political strategy Because new
regionalist discourses regarding territorial
competitiveness, regional learning, associational
networks and the supposed imperatives of globalization have now been widely disseminated among local, regional and national policymakers throughout western Europe, the use of such arguments to justify subnational institutional modifications cannot be viewed simply as an endogenous response to the new regulatory imperatives associated with global capitalism or an integrated EU. On the contrary, the proliferation of new regionalist terminology at various scales of state regulation must be understood as a politically mediated outcome of complex, cross-national forms of policy transfer and ideological diffusion. At the present time, the specific politico-ideological mechanisms through which notions of territorial competitiveness, learning regions, globalization and other new regionalist keywords have been diffused are not well understood. However, any explanation of this trend would clearly need to consider the ‘instrumental utility [of such notions] to powerful industrial, state and social constituencies’ (Lovering, 1999: 399). In short, much of the new discourse regarding regional economic competitiveness and the purported constraints imposed by global territorial competition is profoundly ideological, for it has served to normalize the uneven sociospatial effects of economic restructuring and state retrenchment in the interests of dominant regional class fractions, growth coalitions and political elites (Lovering, 1999).

These considerations point towards a still broader issue that has been occluded in most approaches to the new regionalism – namely, the macro-political context within which contemporary discussions of subnational economic governance are being conducted. Although many new regionalist scholars acknowledge the degree to which the Keynesian welfare national states of the postwar period have been undermined since the early 1970s, most neglect to theorize the manifold ways in which such politico-institutional transformations have impacted the subnational architectures of economic governance within major urban regions. This state-theoretical lacuna in new regionalist research is particularly problematic because, as MacLeod (2000: 221) explains:

... many of the policy innovations associated with the new regionalism should be seen as running parallel alongside a deeper political effort to erode the Keynesian welfarist institutional settlement founded upon the job-for-life, large-firm centered industrial labor markets and integrated welfare entitlement.8

Indeed, most western European national states have coupled their rolling-back of traditional redistributive and managerial-welfarist spatial policies with an aggressive rolling-forward of new forms of locational policy that target strategic subnational spaces as key sites for economic regeneration (Brenner, 2003; forthcoming). This pervasive reworking of national political space has been a ‘major determinant in actively shaping the emerging regional world of “smart” innovation-mediated spaces and trusting social capital(ism)’ (MacLeod, 2000: 221). While it would be a mistake to subsume all aspects of regional economic governance under the rubric of the state’s regulatory activities (Krätke, 1999), it would be equally problematic to bracket the profound ways in which (a) the dismantling of spatial Keynesianism across western Europe has opened up a space within which subnational state institutions have been impelled to adopt new, place-specific developmental strategies; and (b) national states have continued to steer major aspects of subnational territorial development across western Europe.

In the present context, I shall not attempt to elaborate a comprehensive, comparative account of the interconnections between contemporary metropolitan reform initiatives and broader transformations of state spatiality in western Europe. Instead, the remainder of this article develops a stylized state-theoretical interpretation of metropolitan governance reform in western European city–regions that builds upon the foregoing critical perspectives on the new regionalism. While a variety of contextually distinctive pathways of metropolitan governance reform and state spatial restructuring have crystallized in western European national states (Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Salet et al., 2003), the following analysis focuses upon their shared politico-institutional features and evolutionary tendencies.9

As conceived here, contemporary metropolitan institutional reform projects must be interpreted not only with reference to their manifold effects upon local and regional economies, but also with reference to their potentially more durable consequences for
the evolving institutional and territorial infrastructures of state power on various spatial scales. From this point of view, the restructuring of metropolitan governance in western European city–regions can be interpreted as a key politico-institutional mechanism through which broader transformations of state spatiality have been unfolding. I shall argue, in particular, that national states have been significantly reshaped, both functionally and geographically, through their roles in promoting metropolitan institutional reform within strategic urban regions.

These contentions can be unpacked, in a first step, by considering some of the ways in which the contemporary resurgence of metropolitan governance has been intertwined with various structural tendencies and countertendencies of state spatial reorganization. I shall then, in a second step, develop an interpretation of metropolitan governance reform as a path-dependent political strategy through which (national and local) states are attempting to manage the governance failures and crisis-tendencies associated with earlier rounds of local regulatory experimentation.

Metropolitan governance reform and the structural moments of state spatial reorganization

In recent decades, extensive scholarly attention has been devoted to the decentring of nationally scaled forms of state regulatory activity and, concomitantly, to the crystallization of new supranational and subnational regulatory arrangements (Jessop, 1994; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996). However, while considerable evidence now exists that inherited Westphalian forms of political territoriality are being undermined (Anderson, 1996), this development should not be equated with an erosion of the national state form as such or even, necessarily, with a weakening of national state capacities. On the contrary, it can be argued that we are currently witnessing a rehierarchization of modern statehood as the basic functions of Fordist-Keynesian national states are being upscaled and downscaled towards a variety of (pre-existent and newly created) institutional levels within an increasingly multitiered political architecture (Jessop, 2002). Post-Keynesian national states have frequently promoted this relativization of state scalar organization insofar as they have established new regulatory arenas, institutional forms and governance arrangements both above and below the national scale. These trends simultaneously blur the boundaries between inherited scales of political-economic organization and generate new scalar hierarchies, interscalar networks and scale-selective political strategies as competing ‘economic and political forces seek the most favourable conditions for insertion into a changing international order’ (Jessop, 2000: 343).

Building upon such discussions, a number of scholars have recently hypothesized that a qualitatively new form of ‘state spatial selectivity’ is crystallizing as post-Keynesian national states attempt to confront the many contradictory tasks of territorial regulation within contemporary capitalism – from promoting economic development and social reproduction to managing sociospatial inequalities and maintaining political legitimation (Jones, 1997; Brenner et al., 2002). In contrast to the nationally focused patterns of state spatial selectivity that underpinned the Keynesian welfare national state, in which national economies and national societies were naturalized as taken-for-granted arenas for socio-economic policies, these newly emergent, ‘glocalized’ configurations of state spatial selectivity have entailed an intensified targeting of supranational economic blocks and strategic subnational economic zones as sites for accumulation strategies and regulatory projects (Martin and Sunley, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1997). Whereas the postwar project of spatial Keynesianism emphasized the spreading of industry and population evenly across the national territory, contemporary glocalizing competition state regimes are focused upon the systematic reconcentration of industrial capacities, infrastructural investments and labour power within strategic subnational economic spaces, such as global city–regions and major industrial districts (Brenner, 1998; 2003). Since the early 1980s, the mobilization of entrepreneurial approaches to local economic development has represented one particularly prevalent politico-institutional mechanism through which this glocalization of state spatiality has been unfolding throughout western Europe. Within this emergent, if deeply contradictory, framework of political
regulation, intra-national uneven development is no longer viewed as a problem to be alleviated through redistributive regional policies, but rather as the geographical basis on which place- and territory-specific strategies of economic development may be mobilized. In conjunction with this reworking of national territorial space, inherited state institutional structures have also been pervasively reconfigured as new scales and arenas for state intervention are established throughout each national territory.

Bob Jessop’s various writings on state reorganization provide a useful framework through which to situate the most recent wave of metropolitan institutional reform in relation to these newly emergent, reterritorialized and rescaled forms of state spatial selectivity. Jessop distinguishes three major trends of state reorganization – the internationalization of the state; the denationalization of statehood; and the destatization of the political system. First, state internationalization occurs due to the ‘increased strategic significance of the international context of state action and the latter’s extension to a wide range of extraterritorial or transnational factors and processes’ (Jessop, 1999a: 391). Second, state denationalization occurs through the rearticulation of state functions upwards, downwards and outwards to other levels of politico-institutional organization, leading in turn to a systematic reworking of the traditional Fordist-Keynesian formation of statehood (Jessop, 1999a: 387). Third, destatization involves a ‘movement from the taken-for-granted primacy of official (typically national) state apparatuses toward the taken-for-granted necessity of varied forms and levels of partnership between official, parastatal and nongovernmental organizations in managing economic and social relations’ (Jessop, 1999a: 389–90). According to Jessop, each of these trends became particularly apparent following the crisis of the Keynesian welfare national state in the early 1970s and has been further accelerated in conjunction with subsequent processes of geo-economic integration.

Crucially, Jessop (2000: 353–5) also indicates that each of the three trends has been intertwined with a counter-trend of state reorganization that ‘both qualifies and transforms its significance for political class domination and accumulation’: such counter-trends must be viewed as ‘reactions to the new trends rather than as survivals of earlier patterns’ (Jessop, 1999b: 26). State internationalization is thus accompanied by an ‘interiorization’ of international constraints into domestic policy orientations, leading states to engage proactively in various forms of locational policy to promote global competitiveness within their territorial jurisdictions. State denationalization is counterbalanced by the rise of interscalar strategies through which states attempt to ‘control the articulation of scales and the transfer of powers between them’ (Jessop, 2000: 353). Finally, destatization occurs in conjunction with a proliferation of meta-governance strategies through which states attempt to coordinate and supervise the increasingly complex relations between different governance regimes, inter-organizational networks, public–private partnerships and parastate institutional forms within their territories (Jessop, 2000: 354). By underscoring the interplay between these trends and counter-trends, Jessop is able to represent processes of state restructuring as an open-ended, conflictual dialectic rather than as a unilinear transition from one state form to another. The basic elements of these trends and counter-trends of state reorganization are summarized in Table 1.

Most important in the present context, Jessop’s account of state spatial reorganization is attuned to the scale-specific patterns in which each of the aforementioned trends and counter-trends is articulated.

- **National** Jessop devotes particularly nuanced attention to the role of the national scale of state power as a strategic site for each of the trends and their corresponding counter-trends. Because the national scale served as the dominant level of political-economic regulation during the Fordist-Keynesian period, it has also been an essential institutional focal point around which the various trends of state reorganization have been articulated during the last 30 years. Concomitantly, the counter-trends of locational policy, interscalar management and meta-governance may be understood as political strategies through which post-Keynesian national states are attempting to reassert their functional importance to the process of political-economic governance, even as the primacy of the national scale is being decentred.
Supranational Jessop (1999a; 1999b; 2000; 2002) indicates on various occasions that the supranational scale has likewise become an important site for each of the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization, albeit one that has not matched the national scale in strategic or functional importance. Thus supranational political institutions such as the EU represent important expressions of state internationalization, denationalization and destatization as well as key institutional arenas in which new forms of locational politics, interscalar management and meta-governance are being articulated.

Subnational Finally, Jessop’s (1998a; 1997b) writings on entrepreneurial cities underscore the degree to which the local and regional scales have become key arenas for the three trends of state reorganization. As local and/or regional states reorganize themselves in order to rejuvenate economic growth within their territories, they also contribute in important ways to the internationalization, denationalization and destatization of statehood.

Jessop’s remarks on the scalar articulations of the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization are intended primarily to illustrate the manifold policy fields, institutional arenas and spatial sites in which statehood is being transformed. However, Jessop’s categories also provide a useful analytical starting point through which the evolutionary trajectories of state rescaling processes during the post-1970s period may be analysed more closely.

### Table 1 Trends and counter-trends of state spatial reorganization in contemporary capitalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend of state spatial reorganization</th>
<th>Corresponding counter-trend of state spatial reorganization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The internationalization of policy regimes</strong></td>
<td>… and the rise of locational policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National state policies are adjusted to the putatively external constraints of global economic competition.</td>
<td>• Global constraints are increasingly interiorized into the policy paradigms and discursive frameworks of national and subnational institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Global structural competitiveness begins to replace traditional macro-economic goals (such as full employment) as the overarching goal of various forms of national socio-economic policy.</td>
<td>• The promotion of territorial competitiveness and other forms of locational policy (Standortpolitik) become increasingly self-evident goals for state institutions at various spatial scales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The denationalization of statehood</strong></td>
<td>… and the rise of interscalar strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State power is upscaled towards supranational institutional forms and downscaled towards subnational institutional forms.</td>
<td>• State institutions at supranational, national and subnational scales attempt to (re)assert regulatory control over supranational economic flows and to coordinate the relations among different scales of political-economic organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The national scale of political-economic governance is increasingly decentred or relativized.</td>
<td>• Interscalar linkages among extant levels of state power are recalibrated and states introduce new forms of interscalar coordination within strategic and/or crisis-stricken political-economic spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The destatization of the political system</strong></td>
<td>… and the rise of meta-governance strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New forms of governance, public–private cooperation and interorganizational networking are superimposed upon traditional, hierarchical-bureaucratic forms of government and territorial administration.</td>
<td>• State institutions explore new ways of coordinating, controlling and supervising governance processes at a range of spatial scales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-state and para-state institutions, agencies and actors acquire increasingly direct roles in the fulfillment of various state functions at various spatial scales.</td>
<td>• States increasingly attempt to provide the ‘ground rules’ for public–private interaction and to serve as the ‘court of appeal’ for the emergent conflicts regarding the institutional trajectories and goals of governance projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* adapted from Jessop (1998b; 1999a; 1999b; 2000; 2002).
Insofar as each of the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization tends to crystallize predominantly at some geographical scales as opposed to others, and to generate scale-specific political-economic consequences, it is defined by a distinctive pattern of ‘scalar selectivity’. Such scalar selectivities are articulated and continually rearticulated within each trend and counter-trend of state reorganization as diverse socioterritorial forces struggle to reconfigure the scalar organization of state institutions and forms of state intervention towards their own particular ends.

The key issue, in the present context, is the evolving structural positions of subnational scales of regulatory activity in relation to the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization summarized above. As indicated, Jessop’s writings on the national state underscore its role as an arena and medium for each of the trends and counter-trends of state spatial reorganization. Meanwhile, Jessop’s writings on entrepreneurial cities highlight the ways in which the three trends of state reorganization have been articulated at the urban scale. A still more differentiated mapping of newly emergent political spaces in western European city–regions can be developed by examining the contradictory role of local governments within each of the three counter-trends of state spatial reorganization.

- **Local states as agents of locational policy** Given the vast literatures that have emerged on urban entrepreneurialism during the last 15 years (Hall and Hubbard, 1997), it seems plausible to interpret the developmentalist, growth-oriented activities of western European local states as particularly prominent instances of locational policy, and thus as powerful localized expressions of the counter-trend to state internationalization.

- **Intercity networks as agents of interscalar management** Many local states have also become increasingly involved in new forms of interscalar management. The formation of intercity networks, such as EUROCITIES and METREX, through which municipal governments are attempting to promote common political and economic goals, represents a major expression of this development. However, in contrast to nationally based forms of interscalar management, which are generally intended to counteract the tendency of state denationalization, these newly emergent projects of interlocal networking may actually intensify the latter. For, while nationally based forms of interscalar management are grounded upon strategies to regulate the interplay of global, supranational and subnational processes within a coherently bounded (national) territorial jurisdiction, intercity networks generally bypass neighboring scales and territories in order to construct transversal linkages among localities within supranational scalar orbits (Jessop, 2001).

In this sense, the transversal forms of interlocal networking that are currently being promoted by western European local states represent, simultaneously, localized responses to denationalization tendencies and an important mechanism through which the scalar geographies of state denationalization are being further reworked. The example of intercity networks underscores the degree to which state denationalization is being advanced not only through vertical processes of institutional upscaling and downscaling, but also through horizontal processes of inter-organizational cooperation, coordination and alliance formation across geographically dispersed, non-contiguous scales and territories.

- **An absence of localized meta-governance** While local governments have played a key role in establishing various forms of public–private partnership, and thus in advancing the destatization of the political system, they do not appear to be particularly active in promoting countervailing forms of meta-governance within their jurisdictions. At the present time, the coordinative, supervisory and monitoring operations associated with meta-governance appear to be nested predominantly at supralocal scales, including national states and supranational institutional forms such as the European Commission.

These considerations provide a state-theoretical basis on which to interpret the (re)establishment of metropolitan political institutions in major western European city–regions during the last decade. For, although newly emergent metropolitan political forms lack the institutional, fiscal and politico-ideological capacities of national governments, they
appear to have become important scalar sites not only for the trends towards internationalization, denationalization and destatization, but also for each of the corresponding counter-trends of locational policy, interscalar management and meta-governance.

Metropolitan reform initiatives advance state internationalization insofar as they constitute a regional political response to the perceived pressures of intensified global territorial competition; they advance denationalization insofar as they promote city–regions rather than national territories as the privileged level of political-economic regulation; and they advance destatization insofar as they generally entail the establishment of new forms of public–private partnership, coordination and governance in the implementation of major regional policies. At the same time, metropolitan political institutions also appear to have become important geographical arenas in which the three counter-trends of state restructuring are currently being advanced.

• Metropolitan institutions as agents of locational policy Metropolitan reform initiatives have promoted city–regions as sites for new forms of locational policy that interiorize the perceived constraints of international territorial competition directly into local and regional policy agendas. As we have seen, this development has entailed a significant ratcheting-up of earlier forms of local economic development policy onto a metropolitan scale. This project of institutional upscaling has been grounded upon a critique of purely localist strategies of economic development and an affirmation that metropolitan regions rather than cities or localities represent the most appropriate territorial units within which place-specific competitive advantages may be secured. The resultant metropolitanization of locational policy is thus being justified as a means to strengthen the competitive advantages of a regional economy in the face of local market failures and apparently intensifying external pressures.

• Metropolitan institutions as agents of interscalar management Metropolitan reform initiatives have also promoted city–regions as major institutional arenas in which new forms of interscalar management are to be developed. As discussed above, the new metropolitan political institutions of the 1990s have introduced a variety of administrative reforms and regulatory strategies that are intended to alleviate competition between administrative units within an urban region and to coordinate their external political-economic relations through a single organizational framework. At the same time, the new politics of metropolitan reform actively affirms the project of territorial competition between regions on European and global scales. Contemporary metropolitan reform projects can thus be understood as attempts to secure new regionalized scalar fixes and to manage the competitive interactions that underpin interlocal relations within an integrated European economy. To this end, the city–region is being mobilized as the key institutional pivot between an internal realm of cooperation, administrative coordination, embedded firms and sociospatial solidarity and an external space of aggressive territorial competition, intergovernmental austerity, mobile capital flows and unfettered market relations. By (re)calibrating the interplay between competitive and cooperative relations within an urban region, metropolitan political institutions are thus viewed as a means to alleviate the intraterritorial tensions, conflicts and contradictions associated with earlier forms of relatively unregulated interlocality competition.

• Metropolitan institutions as agents of meta-governance Newly established approaches to metropolitan governance in western Europe may also be viewed as an important institutional medium through which new state capacities for meta-governance are being constructed. The mobilization of local economic initiatives during the 1980s generally entailed the transfer of authority to a range of private and para-state actors and organizations. By contrast, the metropolitan reform projects of the 1990s have represented, in many cases, attempts by national and local state institutions to maintain some measure of regulatory coordination over the informal governance networks, quangos, voluntary bodies and public–private partnerships that underpin regional economic governance. In this sense, the new politics of metropolitan
institutional reform may be viewed in part as a strategic subnational response to the increasing fragmentation and differentiation of political authority that ensued within most Western European urban regions during the initial phase of post-Keynesian state retrenchment. In such cases, the goal of metropolitan governance reform is to constrain non-state or para-state actors and organizations to coordinate their activities within a state-dominated institutional framework at a regional scale. Although the new politics of meta-governance have been articulated in diverse forms and have generated variegated politico-institutional consequences within major city-regions, this issue has arguably played an increasingly important role across the entire Western European urban system since the early 1990s.

This general conceptualization of the evolving scalar selectivities associated with each of the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization is summarized in Table 2. It must be immediately emphasized that this representation of the trends and counter-trends of state reorganization is not intended to explain the timing, institutional shape or political form of metropolitan reform initiatives in specific Western European city-regions. Its goal, rather, is to depict in general terms some of the ways in which these metropolitan reform initiatives have been intertwined with scale-specific transformations of state spatiality across Western Europe.

Strategic moments of state spatial reorganization: crisis-tendencies of urban entrepreneurialism

The structural perspective developed above provides an initial basis on which to relate contemporary metropolitan reform initiatives in Western Europe to broader trends and counter-trends of state spatial reorganization. From this point of view, metropolitan institutions have become key arenas in and through which major rescalings of European state space are currently unfolding. As indicated, however, this structural perspective generates no more than a partial account of the current wave of metropolitan institutional reform, for it cannot, in itself, fully illuminate the nationally and locally specific forms in which metropolitan reform initiatives have been articulated or the particular political strategies through which such reforms have been promoted.

In order to explore such issues, it is necessary to explore the moments of ‘strategic choice’ and ‘path-shaping’ in which dominant sociopolitical forces have attempted to ‘redesign the “board” on which they are moving and [to] reformulate the rules of the game’ within major urban regions (Nielsen et al., 1995: 6–7). From this perspective, metropolitan governance arrangements may be viewed as products of path-shaping political strategies that aim to reconfigure the institutional infrastructure of urban and regional spaces. Political strategies focused upon the reconfiguration of state spatial and scalar structures may be oriented towards a diverse range of political-economic projects, including: the entrapment of capital within particular territorial jurisdictions (Cox, 1990); the transformation of local relations of exploitation and domination (Swyngedouw, 1996); the social and/or geographical rechanneling of distributional relays; and the regulation of historically and geographically specific crisis-tendencies and contradictions within a national, regional or local economy (Hudson, 1989; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1996).13

Crucially, such political strategies never emerge on a ‘blank slate’ in which new institutional spaces are forged ex nihilo; rather, they are always embedded within an already partitioned, unevenly developed political geography that has been inherited from earlier patterns of state spatial organization and regulatory activity (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Therefore, new state spaces are produced neither through a simple logic of structural determinism nor through a spontaneous voluntarism, but rather through a mutually transformative evolution of (inherited) spatial structures and (emergent) spatial strategies within an internally differentiated, continually evolving grid of state institutions and regulatory projects (Brenner, forthcoming). This conflictual interaction of inherited institutional landscapes and emergent regulatory projects may be described as a process of state spatial structuration (see also MacLeod, 1999). The rescaled regulatory geographies that have crystallized within major Western European
Table 2 Trends and counter-trends of state reorganization: a general representation of their scalar selectivities at national and subnational scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Regional metropolitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The internationalization of policy regimes …</strong></td>
<td>National states, municipal governments and metropolitan/regional institutions are constrained to adjust inherited policy repertoires to new global competitive pressures: the international context gains structural significance as a basic horizon for policy formation at each scale of state institutional organization.</td>
<td>National states, entrepreneurial local states and newly (re-)established competition-oriented metropolitan governments interiorize global economic constraints in the form of new policies oriented towards territorial competitiveness, inter-place competition, place-marketing and the attraction of inward capital investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… and the rise of locational policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The denationalization of statehood …</strong></td>
<td>National states transfer various regulatory tasks and capacities upwards and downwards to other tiers of state power; intergovernmental relations are recalibrated to privilege subnational state apparatuses (including municipal/regional governments and metropolitan agencies) in the implementation of key policy agendas; entrepreneurial regional and local states acquire more important roles in the formulation and implementation of scale-specific strategies of territorial development.</td>
<td>Metropolitan institutions are (re-)established to alleviate intraregional competition among extant administrative units, to position a city–region strategically within supranational circuits of capital and to coordinate a city–region’s relations to supraregional scales of political-economic organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… and the rise of interscalar strategies</td>
<td>National states promote new horizontal or transversal forms of intermunicipal cooperation in order to achieve common political-economic goals: examples include EUROCITIES and METREX.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The destatization of the political system …</strong></td>
<td>Local states attempt to (re)assert control over the relations between intranational and supranational scales of political-economic organization and to establish new forms of interscalar coordination within and beyond their territorial jurisdictions.</td>
<td>Metropolitan institutions acquire increasingly important roles in regulating, coordinating and supervising the relations among public–private partnerships, voluntary bodies and other informal systems of governance at various scales of a national territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… and the rise of meta-governance strategies</td>
<td>Local states lack major meta-governance functions.</td>
<td>Metropolitan institutions acquire increasingly important roles in regulating, coordinating and supervising the relations among public–private partnerships, voluntary bodies and other informal systems of governance at various scales of a national territory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
city-regions during the last decade have been forged precisely through the interaction of such inherited institutional landscapes and emergent political strategies designed to restructure regulatory arrangements at various spatial scales (see also Peck, 1998; MacKinnon, 2001).

In the case of contemporary western European metropolitan regions, inherited institutional landscapes are derived most immediately from (a) the contextually specific configurations of industrial development, state territorial organization and political-economic regulation that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period; and (b) the contextually specific patterns of crisis formation, institutional restructuring and political struggle that crystallized during the post-1970s period following the exhaustion of the Fordist-Keynesian developmental regime (Lipietz, 1994). Whether or not a given instance of metropolitan governance reform represents an incremental adjustment of, or a radical break from, these inherited institutional landscapes hinges upon the degrees of freedom that have been attained by path-shaping social forces within a particular urban region. For this reason, the results of the process of state spatial structuration can never be foreseen in advance, and are necessarily articulated in place and territory-specific forms. It is possible, nonetheless, to delineate three major types of political strategies that have been associated with the current round of metropolitan institutional reform: accumulation strategies; redistributive strategies; and state strategies.

1. Accumulation strategies Metropolitan institutional restructuring may become an arena for accumulation strategies that attempt to establish a particular model of economic development within an urban region. Such metropolitan accumulation strategies may seek to reduce the costs of investment within a regional economy, and thus to attract mobile capital; they may seek to create non-substitutable, place-specific locational advantages, and thus to enhance capital’s embeddedness within a regional economy; or, they may seek to promote distinctive combinations of the latter agendas. Although accumulation strategies have remained relatively inchoate in many European city-regions, they have played a centrally important role in recent debates on metropolitan political reform. In the cases of Lille, Lyon, Stuttgart and Copenhagen, in particular, metropolitan regulatory reform appears to have contributed quite significantly to the articulation and institutionalization of accumulation strategies at a regional scale during the last 15 years.

2. Redistributive strategies Metropolitan institutional restructuring may also become an arena for redistributive strategies that attempt to recalibrate the social and geographical balance between growth and redistribution within an urban region. Such metropolitan redistributive strategies may entail the introduction of new social and environmental policies to manage the dysfunctional effects of regional economic restructuring as well as new fiscal policies to rechannel tax revenues into fiscally enfeebled city cores and older industrial towns. Whereas the tension between redistribution and growth exists in some form in nearly all contemporary city-regions, it is only politicized under certain circumstances, generally due to the activities of a redistribution-oriented territorial alliance within a national, regional or local economy. Strategies of intraregional fiscal redistribution and territorial equalization have played particularly prominent roles within recent German debates on metropolitan institutional reform.

3. State strategies Finally, metropolitan institutional restructuring may become an arena for state strategies that attempt to modify the specific accumulation regimes, institutional arrangements, patterns of regulatory intervention and forms of interorganizational coordination within an urban region. Such metropolitan-level state strategies may entail a reorientation of local and regional economic policies, a reorganization of the division of regulatory tasks, burdens and responsibilities within extant state institutions and, under some conditions, the creation of entirely new state agencies and regulatory bodies oriented towards specific aspects of regional economic governance. State strategies lie at the very heart of metropolitan institutional reform and are generally a key institutional precondition for the mobilization of political strategies oriented towards other goals, such as accumulation, redistribution and so forth. 14

The central question that emerges from these considerations is: Why have political strategies – whether oriented towards accumulation,
redistribution, an adjustment of state capacities or other regulatory goals – crystallized so pervasively at a metropolitan scale across western Europe during the last decade? The preceding discussion has already indicated how metropolitan regions have become key institutional arenas within which various broader trends and counter-trends of state reorganization have been articulated. As noted, however, metropolitan reform initiatives cannot be explained adequately with reference to their role in contributing to this dynamic of state spatial reorganization: the evolving scalar selectivities of such trends and counter-trends are outcomes, not causes, of the types of political strategies outlined above. A more complete account of the contemporary resurgence of metropolitan reform initiatives can be developed by relating the latter to the path-dependent processes of state spatial restructuring that have ensued across western Europe since the early 1970s.

As noted above, following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism during the 1970s, western European national states began to reorganize inherited regulatory landscapes throughout their territories, particularly at the subnational scales of major urban regions. National states systematically retrenched the local infrastructures of Keynesian welfarism and attempted to impose a new, competitiveness-oriented framework for local economic governance. Traditional compensatory regional policies were abandoned or retrenched; meanwhile, national intergovernmental systems, fiscal relays and welfare arrangements were recalibrated in order to constrain municipal governments to engage more directly in market-driven local economic development policies and other place-marketing initiatives (Mayer, 1992; Harding, 1997). Entrepreneurial cities subsequently proliferated throughout western Europe as local states began to engage proactively in diverse projects to promote endogenous growth, local economic development and territorial competitiveness within their jurisdictions (Parkinson, 1991; Cheshire and Gordon, 1995).

During the course of the 1980s, these entrepreneurial local policies generated significant, if highly uneven and contradictory, impacts upon inherited landscapes of state regulation. In particular, the proliferation of local economic initiatives encouraged zero-sum forms of territorial competition among western European cities, leading in turn to a ‘general trend towards diverting public resources to support private capital accumulation at the expense of social expenditures [and towards] encouraging the search for short-term gains at the expense of more important longer-term investments in the health of cities and the well-being of their residents’ (Leitner and Sheppard, 1997: 305). Consequently, the local economic development strategies of the 1980s tended to intensify uneven spatial development, to encourage a race to the bottom in social service provision, to reinforce or exacerbate entrenched inequalities within national urban hierarchies, and to generate new fault-lines of political conflict at various scales within national territories (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993). Even though some cities managed to acquire short-term competitive advantages through the relatively early adoption of entrepreneurial urban policies, such advantages were generally eroded as urban entrepreneurialism was diffused ever more widely (Leitner and Sheppard, 1997: 303). The proliferation of place-specific strategies of endogenous local economic development during this period also exacerbated a number of regulatory deficits, governance failures and coordination problems within national and local state institutions. Because entrepreneurial local policies enhanced the geographical differentiation of state regulatory activities without establishing new institutional mechanisms for embedding subnational development initiatives and competitive strategies within an overarching national policy framework, they tended to undermine the organizational coherence and functional integration of state institutions. Just as crucially, the intensification of uneven development, sociospatial inequality and interlocality competition within national territories worsened life-chances for significant segments of national populations, and thus frequently triggered significant legitimation problems for national governments (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1996; 1998).

The resurgence of metropolitan reform initiatives during the 1990s may be conceptualized as a constellation of political responses to the policy failures, coordination problems, institutional dislocations and crisis-tendencies associated with the entrepreneurial approaches to local economic governance that prevailed during the preceding decade. Such metropolitan political strategies have
emerged through the combined impacts of deliberate design, institutional learning and chance discoveries as diverse social forces, political coalitions and territorial alliances have struggled to reshape the trajectory of state institutional restructuring. From this perspective, the increasing metropolitanization of locational policy, interscalar management and meta-governance has resulted from nationally and locally specific strategies to strengthen subnational economic development policies while also establishing a variety of flanking mechanisms designed to alleviate the destructive side-effects of traditional, zero-sum forms of urban entrepreneurialism and local regulatory downgrading. Whereas most strategies of metropolitan political reform continue to privilege the goals of promoting local and regional economic development, they generally attempt to address as well some of the major regulatory deficits that have been associated with localist approaches to economic regeneration. The widespread concern of metropolitan reformers with issues such as region-wide cooperation, interlocal policy coordination, interscalar management and meta-governance may be understood with reference to these tendencies of state spatial restructuring during the post-Keynesian period.

This interpretation suggests, furthermore, that the political form and institutional shape of metropolitan reform strategies vary not only by national context but also in relation to the specific types of local economic development policy that were mobilized during the previous two decades. In other words, the path-dependent character of metropolitan institutional change results not only from the impact of inherited landscapes of national state regulation, but also from the legacies of the local economic development policies and crisis-management strategies that were introduced following the exhaustion of North Atlantic Fordism. For it is in relation to the endemic limitations of these local policies, and the contextually specific sociospatial dislocations they have generated, that the alleged need for 'metropolitan solutions to urban problems' has been perceived, politicized and acted upon by the dominant political-economic forces within each national territory. The contradictory legacies of local economic initiatives in different national and local contexts therefore merit detailed attention in any systematic comparative study of metropolitan institutional reform.

It must be emphasized, however, that newly established metropolitan regulatory frameworks generally internalize rather than resolve the crisis-tendencies associated with earlier forms of entrepreneurial urban governance. As argued above, one of the common denominators of metropolitan reform initiatives across western Europe is their promotion of the metropolitan scale as a privileged arena in which new forms of economic development policy are to be mobilized. In each national context, this regionally focused rescaling of state institutional structures and forms of regulatory intervention has itself been fraught with any number of internal tensions and crisis-tendencies that systematically undermine the capacity of metropolitan political institutions to achieve these goals.

First, particularly when powerful social and economic interests are tied closely to extant levels of state territorial organization, the project of metropolitan state rescaling generates intense struggles between opposed class factions, political coalitions and territorial alliances regarding issues such as jurisdictional boundaries, institutional capacities, democratic accountability, fiscal relays and intergovernmental linkages. Relatedly, even when new frameworks of metropolitan political organization are successfully established, any number of unresolved tensions permeate the project of promoting place-specific strategies of economic development within their jurisdictions. In most western European city-regions, the agenda of enhancing regional distinctiveness stands in direct tension with the perceived need to reduce production costs through regulatory downgrading and direct subsidies to capital. Meanwhile, the project of enhancing regional institutional flexibility stands in direct tension with the need for continued fiscal support and administrative coordination from superordinate tiers of the state, including regional and national governments. The specific balance that obtains among these opposed regulatory priorities within a given urban region is thus likewise a matter of intense sociopolitical contestation at a range of spatial scales (Jones, 2001).

Second, the capacity of newly established metropolitan political institutions to manage the crisis-tendencies that pervade contemporary local and regional economies remains deeply problematic. Indeed, most contemporary metropolitan approaches to economic development policy extend
the limitations of earlier, localist approaches to economic rejuvenation onto the larger spatial scale of city-regions. For, in their current, market-led forms, metropolitan political institutions likewise tend to intensify intra-national sociospatial inequality, uneven development and interspatial competition, and thus to undermine the territorial conditions for sustainable economic development. Moreover, despite their explicit attention to problems of interscalar coordination and meta-governance, metropolitan political institutions cannot, in themselves, resolve the pervasive governance failures, regulatory deficits and legitimation problems that ensue as public funds are spread out ever more thinly among a wide number of subnational entrepreneurial initiatives. The metropolitan political institutions that have been introduced throughout western European city-regions during the course of the 1990s thus appear to have exacerbated rather than alleviated the problems of unfettered interspatial competition, uneven development, intergovernmental coordination and political legitimation that accompanied the entrepreneurial urban policies of the preceding decade.

Yet, whatever the limitations of metropolitan reform initiatives as solutions to the endemic crisis-tendencies within contemporary western European city-regions, I would argue that they have nonetheless played a key role during the last decade in redefining the national and subnational geographies of state power throughout western Europe. In particular, the resurgence of metropolitan political institutions appears to have qualitatively modified the landscapes of state regulation that have been emerging since the abandonment of spatial Keynesianism in most western European countries as of the late 1970s. Whereas the proliferation of entrepreneurial approaches to local economic policy during the 1970s and 1980s entailed an initial rescaling of the nationally focused regulatory geographies associated with the postwar Keynesian welfare national state, a further wave of state rescaling has been induced through the metropolitan reform projects of the 1990s. This has in turn generated a marked evolutionary modification of the splintered regulatory geographies that had been established in western European national states immediately following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. Table 3 provides a stylized outline of the ways in which different forms of urban and regional governance have been intertwined with evolving forms of state spatial selectivity in western Europe since the Fordist-Keynesian period.

For present purposes, the essential point is that urban regions represent important institutional arenas in which the conflictual, multiscalar interaction between inherited regulatory geographies and emergent political strategies unfolds. The evolving spatial and scalar selectivities of state institutions represent an outcome of this ongoing interaction while in turn providing a relatively fixed and provisionally stabilized scaffolding of political space in which new regulatory projects may be mobilized at a variety of geographical scales. The regulatory deficits associated with newly established metropolitan political institutions are thus likely to generate a new round of spatially selective regulatory responses and political strategies, leading in turn to further rounds of regulatory experimentation and state spatial restructuring.

Concluding comment: pathways of state spatial structuration

The key question, in short, is not whether the state is globalizing or localizing, but rather what kind of struggles are being waged and by whom, and how the rescaling of the state toward the glocal produces and reflects shifts in relative sociospatial power geometries. (Swyngedouw, 1997: 159)

This article has argued that a resurgence of metropolitan reform initiatives, oriented above all towards the priority of regional economic development, has been occurring since the early 1990s in major city-regions throughout western Europe. Through a critical engagement with recent debates on the new regionalism, I have outlined the basic elements of a state-theoretical interpretation of these new metropolitan reform initiatives. Whereas metropolitan reform initiatives are strongly conditioned by extant frameworks of state territorial organization, they also represent an important political mechanism through which such frameworks are being reterritorialized and rescaled. While the institutional forms and functions of these
rescaled national states are qualitatively different from those associated with the Keynesian welfare
national states of the postwar period, I have argued that contemporary rescaling processes have not
undermined the overarching role of national state institutions in (re)structuring major aspects of local
and regional economic governance. As conceptualized here, then, national states do not
simply filter global forces into a territorial economy but actively produce, reproduce and continually
reshape the institutional-regulatory landscapes within which contemporary processes of global,
national and local restructuring are being articulated (Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 1998).

Table 3 Urban–regional governance and changing configurations of state spatiality in western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporal phase</th>
<th>Dominant form of urban–regional regulation</th>
<th>Form of state spatial selectivity</th>
<th>Major tensions, conflicts and contradictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Fordism: 1960s–early 1970s</td>
<td>• Managerialism: local states operate mainly as sites of welfare service provision and collective consumption. • Metropolitan institutions serve to coordinate the provision of welfare services and to manage the physical expansion of large-scale Fordist urban agglomerations.</td>
<td>• Spatial Keynesianism: national states promote economic development by spreading industry, population and infrastructural investment evenly across the national territory. • Primacy of the national scale of state regulation: national economies, national societies and national urban systems are viewed as pre-given territorial arenas for economic, social and spatial relations.</td>
<td>• Urban cores and growth poles may overheat due to processes of cumulative causation. • Distributional struggles proliferate as peripheral localities and regions articulate demands for central subsidies. • National and local fiscal crises ensue as struggles intensify over the appropriate balance of growth vs redistribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First wave of glocalization strategies and crisis-management: early 1970s–late 1980s</td>
<td>• Entrepreneurialism: local states acquire more important roles in the promotion of local economic development and other place-marketing strategies. • Metropolitan institutions are abolished or significantly downsized in conjunction with welfare state retrenchment programmes.</td>
<td>• The rise of glocalization strategies: national states promote the reconcentration of economic capacities and infrastructure investments into the most globally competitive cities and industrial districts within their territories. • Supranational and subnational scales of state regulation acquire an enhanced significance in accumulation strategies and regulatory processes.</td>
<td>• Intensified uneven development and zero-sum forms of interlocity competition undermine national economic stability. • Local economic initiatives trigger systemic governance failures due to a lack of supralocal policy coordination. • National and local legitimation crises ensue as sociospatial inequality intensifies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second wave of glocalization strategies and crisis-management: early 1990s–present</td>
<td>• Competitive regionalism: metropolitan institutions are rejuvenated in conjunction with projects to promote interlocity cooperation and regional economic development. • Metropolitan institutions acquire new roles in various aspects of interscalar management and meta-governance.</td>
<td>• The metropolitanization of glocalization strategies: national states target large-scale metropolitan regions rather than cities or localities as the most appropriate scales for economic rejuvenation. • Metropolitan and regional scales gain a new significance in strategic spatial planning, crisis-management, intergovernmental coordination and the regulation of uneven spatial development.</td>
<td>• Metropolitan institutional reforms trigger an upscaling of the problems of uneven development, intensified sociospatial inequality, inadequate policy coordination and legitimation to major metropolitan regions. • Crisis-tendencies and governance failures are rescaled upwards but remain unresolved at a national scale.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This article has also outlined a methodological strategy through which the interplay between urban–regional restructuring and ongoing transformations of state spatiality may be theorized and explored more systematically. I have emphasized, on the one hand, that city–regions have become key geographical sites in which various trends and counter-trends of state reorganization are being articulated. On the other hand, this discussion has suggested that the geographies of state power in western Europe are being rescaled through a conflictual interaction between inherited landscapes of regulation and emergent, path-shaping political strategies oriented towards the transformation of those landscapes. This conceptualization has provided a basis on which to interpret contemporary struggles over metropolitan institutional reform as strategic political responses to some of the regulatory deficits, governance failures and crisis-tendencies induced by earlier projects of urban entrepreneurialism.

Contemporary metropolitan reform initiatives in western Europe must be viewed, simultaneously, as path-dependent outcomes of inherited geographies of state regulatory activity and as path-shaping political strategies through which the scalar contours of such geographies are being fundamentally reworked.

Whereas the present article has schematically explored this interaction between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent regulatory projects with reference to the case of metropolitan institutional reform, I would argue that this methodological strategy could be fruitfully applied to many other aspects of state spatial restructuring, at a broad range of geographical scales, under contemporary capitalism. Additional cross-national and comparative research on these matters is urgently needed in order to enhance our theoretical understanding of the many different institutional pathways, political strategies and social struggles through which the geographies of statehood have been reworked throughout the world economy since the exhaustion of North Atlantic Fordism in the early 1970s (see Brenner et al., 2002).

By way of conclusion, it is worth underscoring one of the key themes that has been raised by the preceding analysis – namely, the political geographies of capitalist crisis. The approach deployed here is intended to contribute to the crisis-theoretical approaches to regulatory transformation that have been developed in recent years by ‘4th generation’ regulationists and other critical geographers. Thus conceived, crisis is not a single, totalized event but an endemic tendency within capitalist society that can be shown to underpin a broad range of apparently unrelated economic realignments, institutional adjustments and political struggles (Harvey, 1982). In the context of state regulatory restructuring, this conceptualization entails a rejection of the traditional regulationist vision of crisis as a linear transition from one fully formed mode of regulation to the next, and concomitantly, an analytical emphasis on the ways in which crises are mediated through open-ended processes and strategies of regulatory change at multiple spatial scales, at divergent temporal rates and within diverse institutional configurations. The preceding analysis has attempted to expand our understanding of the spatio-temporality of processes of institutional-regulatory restructuring by emphasizing their strongly path-dependent character. From this perspective, I have suggested that the strategies of state regulation and crisis-management that are adopted during one phase of crisis-induced capitalist restructuring have a massive impact upon the strategies that are adopted during subsequent phases of crisis-induced restructuring (Florida and Jonas, 1991). This proposition has been illustrated here through the argument that contemporary metropolitan reform initiatives have been conditioned strongly by the regulatory deficits and governance failures within earlier approaches to urban entrepreneurialism — which were in turn said to be conditioned strongly by the crisis-tendencies within Fordist-Keynesian forms of urban governance. On this basis, we can anticipate that the structural limitations of contemporary metropolitan reform projects will in turn powerfully shape the political and institutional form in which future strategies of state spatial restructuring will be articulated, whether at local, regional, national or supranational scales. Future studies of new state spaces could be significantly advanced through more explicit, crisis-theoretical investigations of the contextually specific pathways through which state spatial restructuring unfolds.
Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Susanne Heeg and Gordon MacLeod for incisive comments on a previous draft. I assume full responsibility for all errors of fact or interpretation. An early version of this article was written during my work as a James Bryant Conant Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University (2000–2001). I am grateful to the Center for its support.

Notes

1 See, for example, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999); Jessop (2000; 2002); Hudson (2001); Jones (2001); MacKinnon (2001); MacLeod (2001).

2 The relevant literature on these developments is vast and rapidly expanding. The following sources provide useful and representative overviews in English, French and German: Aigner and Mooga (1994); Weck (1995); Saez et al. (1997); Jouve and Lefèvre (1999); BeBR 2000; Heine (2000); Saller (2000); STANDORT (2000); Herrschel and Newman (2002); Salet et al. (2003).

3 As deployed here, the notion of locational policy refers to spatially selective state strategies intended: (a) to enhance the structural competitiveness of particular territorial jurisdictions; and (b) to position those jurisdictions strategically within broader circuits of capital accumulation (Brenner, 2000). While the term ‘locational policy’ (Standortpolitik) is derived from contemporary German policy debates on Standort Deutschland (Germany as an investment location), it is used here in a more specific, social-scientific sense to describe particular types of state strategies. Such strategies are characterized by spatial selectivity insofar as they: (a) are mobilized by scale and place-specific state institutions; (b) are grounded upon particular spaces of competitiveness; and (c) are oriented towards particular spaces of competition (on these distinctions, see Brenner, 2000). On state strategies, see Jessop (1990) and Jessop et al. (1988); on state spatial selectivity, see Jones (1997; 1998); on the interplay between state spatial strategies and state spatial selectivity, see Brenner (forthcoming).

4 It should be noted, however, that supporters of metropolitan institutional reform in contemporary western Europe have embraced a variety of radically opposed programmes for regional economic development, ranging from neoliberal, cost-cutting and deregulatory initiatives to ‘offensive’, associationalist or social democratic strategies focused upon democratically negotiated settlements within the local population (Ronneberger and Schmid, 1995).

5 Analogous methodological tendencies underpinned many early applications of French regulation theory to the study of local politics. In this context, local institutional changes were commonly ‘read off’ from posited macro-economic shifts, such as the putative transition to post-Fordism (for discussion see Peck, 2000).

6 The distinction between ‘vulgar’ and ‘sophisticated’ approaches to the new regionalism is derived from Lovering (1999).

7 In other words, the basic concepts of the new regionalism have come to serve not only as categories of analysis but also as categories of practice (see Bourdieu, 1977).

8 Lovering (1999: 392) articulates a closely analogous point by suggesting that the new regionalism ‘bypasses the political motors of decentralization and fails to address the political construction of markets and economic actors more generally’.

9 In Tilly’s (1990) terms, the following discussion is grounded upon a combination of ‘encompassing’ and ‘universalizing’ comparisons: its goal is to analyse common institutional changes among European cities in terms of: (a) their embeddedness within a shared geo-economic and Europe-wide political-economic space; and (b) their broadly shared pathways of industrial change and political-economic restructuring during the last 30 years. This emphasis on commonalities among western European states and cities should not, however, be construed as an endorsement of the view that contemporary globalization entails a simple empirical convergence of institutional outcomes. On the contrary, I believe that ‘individualizing’ and ‘variation-finding’ comparisons (Tilly, 1990) are more important than ever under contemporary geo-economic conditions as a means to underscore the impressive diversity of institutional dynamics and political struggles through which contemporary cities are being shaped and reshaped. See Brenner (2001) for a more detailed discussion of the potential contributions of each of these approaches to comparative analysis in the context of contemporary urban studies.

10 To be sure, this denationalization of state functions has occurred in close conjunction with an increasing allocation of major regulatory tasks to a variety of non-state actors and institutions. However, as Jessop (2002) has indicated, the proliferation of such governance networks has undermined the organizational unity of national states without eroding their functional centrality to the basic tasks of political-economic regulation under contemporary capitalism.


13 In this context, it should also be noted that political
strategies oriented towards the reconfiguration of a particular scale of state territorial organization may be animated by sociopolitical forces rooted within other scales of state power: thus national states, major subnational state institutions (e.g. Länder, regional governments, provinces, etc.) or, under some conditions, municipalities, have generally played essential roles in the establishment of new frameworks for metropolitan governance in contemporary western Europe.

14 As Jessop et al. (1993: 37, italics added) indicate, state strategies attempt to establish the requisite level of ‘apparatus unity’ to enable the state to pursue accumulation strategies and other regulatory projects within civil society: ‘State capacities to advance an accumulation strategy depend in turn on the state’s second-order capacity to reflect upon and manage its capacities to pursue strategies which secure its own internal unity... Indeed, the need to establish apparatus unity might well lead to policies which appear irrelevant or contradictory in relation to accumulation strategies. But, without a modicum of apparatus unity... the state could not realize the political conditions needed to implement an accumulation strategy.’ Insofar as state strategies of metropolitan institutional reform attempt to reconfigure the form of regulation within an urban region, they might also be viewed as projects of ‘meta-regulation’ (Collinge, 1999).


References


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